GPS interference over the southern North Sea, 9 November 2026

Analytic answer by John Wiseman (@lemonodor.bsky.social), produced with HEXBIRD. As of 13 November 2026. Fixed snapshot; the data on this page does not update.

From 17:08Z to 17:27Z on 9 November 2026, about 80 aircraft over the Netherlands, the southern North Sea, eastern England and north-west Germany lost GPS at the same time.

The pattern fits a single radio transmitter at or near sea level over the North Sea, probably about 80 to 110 NM north of Texel. It does not fit a source over the Dutch mainland.

It is the largest GPS-interference event in this area in the past year. The only similar event, on 23 July 2026, came from a different place, off the English coast.

The event was first reported by gpswise.aero and discussed in a Bluesky thread by auonsson. gpswise reported 50 flights affected for 20 minutes over the Netherlands. This report checks that claim against ADS-B data and estimates where the interference came from.

Key findings

These are measurements from ADS-B data:

Key judgments

HEXBIRD assesses that it is almost certain that a radio-frequency transmitter caused the GPS loss, rather than space weather or a data-processing fault. Confidence is high. The simultaneous start and stop, the sharp line-of-sight boundary and agreement between independent data sources all point the same way.

HEXBIRD assesses that it is likely that the source was at or near sea level over the southern North Sea, roughly 80 to 110 NM north of Texel. Our best estimate is 54.65N 5.05E. The model's 95% region (54.55N to 54.75N, 4.95E to 5.15E) does not mean a 95% chance that the transmitter is there: it comes from a simple model that makes many assumptions and may be wrong. Confidence in that position is low. We made this estimate after a convoy was reported nearby, and it depends on how sharply the jamming stopped at the radio horizon: if it reached all the way to the horizon, the best fit moves about 18 NM north. The location comes from a propagation model, not a direct measurement.

The data cannot show who operated the transmitter or why. This report makes no judgment on that.

Timing and scale of the event

Aircraft reporting NACp below 6 in each minute, 16:45Z to 17:49Z, 9 November 2026, within 47N to 58N, 4W to 14E. Only aircraft that reported NACp 9 or higher at some point that day are counted. Source: HEXBIRD default.traces. These counts understate the event, because the trace archive records a field only when it changes.
Aircraft per hour above 3,000 ft reporting NACp below 6 or NIC below 5, 6 to 10 November 2026, within 50.5N to 55.5N, 1E to 9E. The single spike is 17Z on 9 November. The small dawn peaks on every day are low-accuracy aircraft, not interference. Source: HEXBIRD default.traces.

Only aircraft at cruise altitude were affected

The share of affected aircraft depended mainly on altitude. Aircraft below FL150 were almost never affected, even close to the centre of the affected area. This is what happens when a transmitter near the surface is hidden from low aircraft by the curve of the Earth.

Altitude0 to 75 NM75 to 150 NM150 to 225 NM225 to 300 NM
Below 5,000 ft0 of 101 of 160 of 151 of 37
5,000 to 15,000 ft0 of 60 of 120 of 150 of 38
15,000 to 25,000 ft1 of 41 of 110 of 260 of 37
25,000 ft and above21 of 3027 of 735 of 986 of 139
Affected aircraft out of all aircraft seen from 17:12Z to 17:25Z, by distance from 52.6N 5.9E. That point is the average position of degraded reports, so it shows where the traffic was, not where the source was. Source: HEXBIRD default.traces.

Two aircraft near the fitted source show the same pattern:

Where the source probably was

We fitted a model of a transmitter at sea level to ADS-B Exchange snapshots taken about a minute apart from 17:09Z to 17:26Z. Inside the transmitter's reach, a fixed share of aircraft lose GPS; beyond it, almost none do. The reach is set near each aircraft's radio horizon, and one range of bearings may be jammed more weakly. Positions come from ADS-B only: an affected aircraft is placed on the straight line between its last good position before losing GPS and its first after regaining it.

GPS lostGPS healthymodel's 95% regionbest fitRussian-flagged convoy, 17:08Z to 17:26Z
Aircraft at 17:18:15Z from an ADS-B Exchange snapshot, positioned from ADS-B only. Dot size increases with altitude. The shaded area is the model's 95% region: how far noise in the data alone could move this model's estimate. It is not a 95% chance that the transmitter is there. Rings show the radio horizon from a sea-level source at the best fit (54.65N 5.05E) for aircraft at 10,000 ft (123 NM, dashed) and 37,000 ft (237 NM, solid). The magenta line is the convoy's approximate track during the event and the dots are its three ships as Sentinel-1 saw them at 17:17Z, matched to MarineTraffic positions published by auonsson. An aircraft counts as having lost GPS when the receiver marks it as having lost GPS, or when it reports NACp below 6 or NIC below 5.

The best fit is at 54.65N 5.05E. Inside the transmitter's reach, 86% of aircraft lost GPS, except to the north-east (bearings 0° to 90° from the source), where 18% did. Reach ended at 0.94 of the radio horizon. If it had ended exactly at the horizon, the best fit would move to 54.95N 5.1E, but the data fit that less well. At the best fit, 14 of the 15 aircraft that lost GPS while climbing, or regained it while descending, did so between 0.90 and 1.00 of their radio horizon. The 15th was in the weakly jammed north-east sector.

We simulated events from a known source, keeping each aircraft's tendency to stay jammed or healthy, and refitted them to set the region's size. The model's 95% region (shaded) covers about 54.55N to 54.75N, 4.95E to 5.15E, roughly 50 square NM. In 200 test simulations from the fitted model it contained the true source 97% of the time.

This is not a 95% chance that the transmitter is in the region. The region only measures how much random noise in the data could move the estimate if the model were exactly right, and the model is simple. It assumes a single transmitter at sea level, a smooth Earth with standard refraction, a sharp edge to the jamming, the same jammed share everywhere inside it except one weaker sector, and aircraft positions interpolated in straight lines. If any of these is wrong, the true position could lie well outside the region. For example, a transmitter whose jamming reached all the way to the radio horizon would put the best fit about 18 NM further north.

The convoy

On the morning of 9 November, the ship spotter vesselspotter reported three Russian-flagged cargo ships, MAIA-1, LADY D and LADY R, heading south through the North Sea towards the English Channel at about 10 knots. MarineTraffic shows MAIA-1 (138 m) and LADY R (123 m) last calling at Baltiysk, Russia, and lists both under EU and US sanctions, and LADY R under UK sanctions too. On 13 November auonsson, crediting vesselspotter, reported that the convoy, possibly with a warship escort, passed through the area during the event and attributed the jamming to it.

We made this estimate after that report and knew where the convoy was when we chose the model. The convoy passed 13 to 17 NM north-east of the best fit, outside the model's 95% region. If the jamming reached all the way to the radio horizon, the best fit would move about 18 NM north, closer to the convoy, so this estimate does not rule the convoy out. Sentinel-1 shows the three ships at 17:17Z (below). In ADS-B data from 11:00Z to midnight we saw no maritime patrol aircraft over the southern North Sea; the closest aircraft of any kind below 15,000 ft passed 28 NM from the convoy's track, an offshore helicopter at 14:28Z.

Sentinel-1 radar pass during the burst

Sentinel-1C passed over at 17:16:36Z to 17:17:26Z, during the burst, and imaged about 70% of the model's 95% region, including the best estimate, at about 17:16:58Z; a strip 1 to 4 km wide along the region's western edge falls in the image's no-data border. It shows no ship in the imaged part. The nearest detection is a 265 m vessel candidate (length includes smear) 4.4 NM east of the best fit. The detector finds almost all ships of 100 m or more, but fewer small ones. Three ships in a north-east to south-west column at 54.83N to 54.87N, 5.24E to 5.28E match the convoy's MarineTraffic positions: LADY D and MAIA-1, and probably LADY R. Their radar extents (170 to 203 m) are longer than the ships (123 and 138 m where known) because of smear and wakes. A fourth target, 118 m and unidentified, lies 0.4 km from LADY D; it could be an escort, but the radar cannot tell.

model's 95% regionvessel candidate, 17:17Zconvoy shipunidentified target beside the convoyfixed platformC-band interference stripe
Sentinel-1C swath at 17:16:36Z to 17:17:26Z on 9 November 2026 (blue outline), ship detections from automated detection on the radar image (no type or length estimate; sizes include smear; a fixed platform was seen at the same spot in 3 earlier passes and matches a mapped platform in OpenStreetMap), and the 3 interference stripes seen in the VH channel. A stripe marks when the radar received interference, not where the emitter was. Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026.

The past year in this area

We counted, for every hour from 1 November 2025 to 10 November 2026, aircraft above FL200 over 51N to 56N, 1E to 9E that reported NIC below 5 or NACp below 6. That is about 9,000 hours.

The 17Z hour on 9 November had 111 affected aircraft. A typical hour has 3. In 99.9% of hours there were 15 or fewer.

Highest hourly count of aircraft above FL200 with NIC below 5 or NACp below 6, per day, 1 November 2025 to 10 November 2026, within 51N to 56N, 1E to 9E. Source: HEXBIRD default.traces. Short bursts are diluted in hourly counts, so smaller events can be hidden.

Only one other hour stands out, 19Z on 23 July 2026, with 58 affected aircraft. It looks like the same kind of event:

It came from a different place, though:

The 23 July fit lies inside the area of UK NOTAM B1139/26, which warned of GNSS jamming for Exercise Storm Warrior off the English east coast. But that notice covered 09:00Z to 11:00Z on 21, 23, 28 and 30 July, from the surface to 20,000 ft. Those windows show no effect on aircraft above FL200. The 19:00Z event falls outside every notified window.

Hourly counts can hide a short burst, so we also scanned every minute of every day for sudden jumps in the number of affected aircraft above 8,000 ft. Only 3 bursts in the year reached 12 or more aircraft at once:

We have not examined the 3-minute burst on 14 October. The scan also flags many small bursts around dawn, between 03:30Z and 05:30Z. These involve 5 to 10 aircraft while traffic is light, and they look like normal low-accuracy aircraft rather than interference.

Two other hours were slightly raised, 08Z on 22 February (29 aircraft) and 08Z to 09Z on 14 October (26 aircraft). Both rise and fall gradually over an hour or more. They do not look like the same kind of event.

Why the GPSJAM map shows almost nothing

GPSJAM's map for 9 November leaves the Netherlands green, with 8 yellow hexes over the sea. The main reason is that it averages over a whole day. For each H3 hex (about 45 km across) it counts aircraft once per UTC day, as bad if ADS-B Exchange marked them as having lost GPS. It then colours the hex by (bad − 1) ÷ all aircraft: yellow from 2%, red from 10%.

A 19-minute burst is a small share of a day's traffic. Busy hexes over the Netherlands see 250 to 700 aircraft a day, and the burst added at most 7 bad ones. The worst hex scored (7 − 1) ÷ 426 = 1.4%.

Counting method, 66 hexes hit by the burstMedian shareHighestYellow / red
16:55Z to 17:30Z only12.5%50%20 / 45
Whole day, also counting MLAT positions2.0%6.9%32 / 0
Whole day, as published0.7%3.6%8 / 0

2 smaller factors add to this. The minus one removes much of a signal that is only 4 to 7 aircraft strong. And GPSJAM skips MLAT positions, which were 78% of reports from affected aircraft, so most were counted bad in only 1 or 2 hexes.

The 8 yellow hexes are quiet offshore cells with 26 to 47 aircraft all day, where the burst's 2 bad aircraft were enough. gpswise also shows small daily numbers for its Dutch hexes (6 of 1,625 and 11 of 2,604 flights); it shows the event through hourly detail.

low (below 2%)medium (2% to 10%)high (10% or more)
GPSJAM interference level per H3 resolution-4 hex, 9 November 2026, using GPSJAM's rule: (bad aircraft − 1) ÷ all aircraft. "As published" is GPSJAM's ADS-B Exchange file for the day; the merged airplanes.live file gives the same picture (7 yellow hexes). The other 2 layers are our reconstructions from ADS-B Exchange snapshots. Select a hex to see its counts.

Other explanations considered

ExplanationWhat it predictsWhat we see
Space weather (ionospheric scintillation)a gradual, patchy onset over a wide region, with no altitude dependencea start within 6 seconds over about 510 km and a sharp boundary at the radio horizon. Rejected.
Data or processing faulteffects on one feed, one receiver network or one avionics typemore than 20 operators and many aircraft types, seen in ADS-B Exchange, airplanes.live (through GPSJAM) and gpswise. Rejected.
Source over the Dutch mainlandlow aircraft near Schiphol and Lelystad affectedno low aircraft affected. The model fit is much worse. Rejected.
Airborne transmitterlow aircraft near the source affected, with a fitted height well above sea levelbest fit at sea level, but height is poorly constrained. No candidate aircraft identified. Not ruled out.
Several transmittersa footprint that is not one circle, or starts at different timesone start time and one footprint. Two nearby sources cannot be told apart from one. Not ruled out.
Spoofing rather than jammingaffected aircraft reporting a shared false position or a coherent shiftonly small scatter and isolated glitches that jump back and forth. No sign of spoofing.

Limitations

Next checks

These checks would most narrow down the source:

Method and sources